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A GREAT SCHOLAR AND A GREAT MAN
Matthew B. Arnould∗
“I’m going to tell you a story,” the famous law professor announced.
“Warning at the outset: There will be points in this story when you’re going
to think that this is nothing more than endless ramblings and reminiscence.
And there may be some truth to that. But, more importantly, I’m going to
provide an elaborate groundwork for you to understand perhaps the most
important concept in legal thought that you’re going to hear in your entire
lifetime. And that’s an understatement!” Professor Redish waited politely
for the laughter to subside. “Actually, I’m not kidding.”
On October 22, 2006, Marty Redish changed my life. This was a feat
that he would accomplish repeatedly as I became his research assistant, he
became my mentor, and, above all, we became good friends. But on that
October afternoon—among my first days as a law student—I did not know
Marty Redish except by reputation. And as I watched him at the lectern, I
indulged visions of naïve grandeur concerning my chosen profession.
The law was, I imagined, a theatrical endeavor on at least some
level—an intellectual cityscape populated by debonair advocates and fasttalking deal junkies who propelled the engines of justice and commerce
beneath supple armors of virgin wool, Italian leather, and Chinese silk. Its
pantheon included Daniel Webster, Henry Drummond, Arnie Becker, and
just about any character that Aaron Sorkin might dream up. Jack McCoy
was its philosopher king, Harper Lee its documentarian. But over the next
ten minutes, I bid the likes of Atticus Fitch adieu as Marty peeled back the
blinders, exposed an intricate clockwork of legal thought, and replaced
fantasy with a far more compelling reality.
It began where the great stories often begin—with a dead fox in New
York, a paddling of ducks in Maine, a beached whale in California, and a
young law student’s love–hate relationship with his law professor—
namely, the famous A. James Casner. Marty described Professor Casner as
“the scariest dude that I encountered in law school.” A devotee of Socratic
pedagogy, Professor Casner would pose quandaries leagues beyond the
intellectual limits of his students, scan his classroom like an apex predator,
and, following an inevitable collective gasp from the gallery, select his
victim. In those salad days, Marty studied case law concerning the legal
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definition of a wild animal, or ferae naturae—an animal not designated as
domesticated by law. He spent halcyon weeks in the company of
Blackstone, Fleta, and Justinian until, one rueful morning, Professor Casner
announced ominously: “Tomorrow, I want you to come in with a definition
of wild animals that takes into account every case we’ve read on the
subject.”
Marty, a city boy, was ill equipped for the task. Even today, Marty can
flawlessly recite the Brooklyn Dodgers starting lineups from 1941 through
1957, but as he reads this very tribute, has no idea what to make of the
phrase “paddling of ducks.” Still, Marty persevered, and inspired in no
small part by abject terror of being caught unprepared by Professor Casner,
Marty’s study group set out to meet the challenge. But each time a group
member proposed a definition, another would observe that it failed to
account for the fox case, or the duck case, or the whale case. Late that
night, defeated and exhausted, Marty and his comrades declared: “Kill us;
do anything you want; we just don’t know.” As Marty told it, breakfast the
next morning felt like a last meal as he silently calculated the probability
that Professor Casner would call upon him that day.
To Marty’s simultaneous relief and consternation, Professor Casner
did not revisit the question that day or any other day. Instead, he advanced
to the next chapter of his property casebook—the definition of “wild
animals” be damned! That afternoon, after Marty expended what he
described as considerable mental energy contemplating professor-cide, he
experienced an epiphany. The reason the group was unable to ascertain a
comprehensive definition was simple: No such definition exists.
At this point in his story, Marty grew stoic, his voice quiet. “Do you
know why no such definition exists?” he asked. The words hovered in the
air like zeppelins. The classroom was silent. Marty had masterfully led us
to aporia, and we eagerly awaited revelation. In law, Marty explained,
“there is no abstract floating-in-the-air definition of terms.” There are legal
consequences that flow from definitions. Thus, different jurisdictions with
different social and economic needs at different points in history will define
terms to meet the social and economic needs of the times.
And there it was: A concept that would forever reshape my worldview.
The tumblers clicked into place. And, though it may sound trite, in that
moment Marty inspired me to love the law. Marty had crystallized what I
too have come to believe that the law is all about. Law is not a function of
extremes, but of balance. It is neither a product of rigid abstract formalism
nor of epistemological nihilism. It is, properly understood, a synthesis of
the two—of principled analysis combined with social jurisprudence. Thus,
within reasonable linguistic boundaries, words—the term “wild animal,”
for example—can mean different things in different jurisdictions based
upon varying considerations of social purpose. Or, in Marty’s words, you
define your terms in a streetwise way and apply them in a principled way to
meet the standards of the rule of law. To do that, you cannot switch among
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definitions depending on whether or not you personally support the
outcome of the analysis. You must render your definition based upon a
categorical, transparent choice—whatever social need you endeavor to
foster—and then you must enforce that choice in a principled manner.
Marty paused again. “Pretty much every bit of my scholarship in one
way or another comes back to this basic insight,” he said.
This was heavy stuff. Heavier still as I realized that all I thought I
knew about law—the dramatic wrangling in the matters of Right v.
Wrong—was essentially fictional. The philosophical space that Marty
inhabited was not one of blind advocacy or righteous indignation. It was
one that married principal, pragmatism, and purpose. From that moment
forward, I wanted to learn everything that Marty Redish was willing to
teach me.
Marty’s story ended on a humorous note. The young law student,
thrilled with this basic insight, approached Professor Casner at the end of
the semester and thanked him for changing his life. Professor Casner gave
Marty an appropriately Kingsfieldesque look and sauntered off. “But
twenty years after his death, I’m still talking about him,” Marty quipped. “I
guess you can’t argue with that!”
There, thankfully, whatever parallels may exist in our respective
coming-of-age stories depart. When I approached Professor Redish and
thanked him for the tremendous insight, he smiled and asked me if I might
like to discuss the matter over a cold beer. In the following months and
years, over countless hours of spirited discussion and correspondence,
Marty and I would continue to build on, and would even coauthor an article
on, this core interpretive philosophy. Yet, we would spend just as much
time discussing values, family, personal histories, and, of course, baseball,
as we would the intricacies of law. Looking back, I am forever grateful to
Marty for teaching me what it means to be a good and decent lawyer, but,
much more than that, I am grateful to him for helping to instill in me what
it means to be a good and decent man. Marty has joked that I am the gentile
son that he never had—something that I consider a true honor. Marty is
certainly someone that I consider a father figure, and I feel remarkably
lucky to be able to say that.
This was a sentiment that was echoed time and time again at the
symposium in honor of Marty as panelists recounted just how much Marty
means to them and how essential he has been to their lives. One panelist
recounted how she continues to follow Marty’s advice: “If your legal
analysis and politics line up more than once in a blue moon, stop and think
again.” And heads around the room nodded knowingly: “Yes, I too follow
that advice.” Another panelist described how Marty’s sense of humor has
stayed with him throughout his career—allowing him to add levity to even
the most tense of situations. And, again, heads around the room nodded:
“Yes, Marty taught me to do that too.” The lessons that Marty imparts, in
other words, are indelible.
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The reason is simple: Professor Martin Redish is a truly great legal
mind and scholar. But Marty Redish is a truly great man, beloved by his
family, students, colleagues, and friends. We would all be much, much
poorer in Marty’s absence—and, despite their critical importance, that has
nothing to do with his theories on the law. I have absolutely no doubt that
twenty years after his death, I will still be talking about him. I guess you
can’t argue with that.
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